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I. Introduction
Events often gain a momentum of their own, sometimes well beyond that
anticipated by those who set them in motion; this is as true in the field of
law as it is in other areas of human endeavour. MorguardInvestments Ltd.
v. De Savoye' is a legal event which seems to be taking on a rapidly
building momentum. Basing themselves on this decision, Canadian
courts, especially those in British Columbia, are recognizing and enforcing
judgments from other courts in civil matters, even when these judgments
bear few, if any, of the hallmarks that traditionally entitled a foreign
judgment to be recognized and enforced in Canada.
Now clearly the leading Canadian case on the enforcement of domestic
judgments, Morguard brought about a sea change in Canadian practice
and effectively reversed a century of judicial pronouncement, at least as
far as Canadian judgments are concerned, i.e. judgments issued by the
courts of the Canadian provinces and territories. In several recent cases,
Canadian courts have shown themselves willing to push the principles of
the Morguard judgment beyond the strict bounds of the case, and have
been extending its innovative recognition and enforcement views to
matters arising outside Canada. While this is notnecessarily inappropriate,
it does give rise to a certain degree of concern and could lead to a
re-balkanization of Canadian practice-now towards foreignjudgments-
if the trend is not sanctioned and structured by the Supreme Court or by
Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
* Simon Coakeley is a Master of Law student at the University of Ottawa Graduate School of
Law. Peter Finkle is with Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada and is an Adjunct Professor
of Law at the University of Ottawa Graduate School of Law where he has taught Conflicts of
Law. Louise Barrington is a member of the Ontario and New York Bars and at the time of
writing was a Visiting Professor at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, teaching Tort,
Conflicts of Law and the Law of the European Community. The opinions expressed herein are
those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Government of Canada. The authors
would like to express their appreciation to Otdvio Lom6naco for his assistance in the
preparation of this paper.
1. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 52 B.C.L.R. (2d) 160, 76
D.L.R. (4th) 256, 122 N.R. 81, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 217, 46 C.P.C. (2d) 1, 51 R.P.R. (2d) 1
(hereafter referred to as Morguard and cited to S.C.R.).
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II. Recognition and enforcement of intra-Canadian judgments:
Then and now
The common law rules for asserting jurisdiction were based on the
concept of territoriality which itself was closely linked to the power of a
court to enforce any order it made. Thus, if a defendant was served within
the territory of the court, or submitted to a court's jurisdiction, either by
agreement or by attornment, that court would have jurisdiction in the
case. To these two fundamental rules were added a myriad of other
circumstances which provided for jurisdiction based on service exjuris,
either as of right or with judicial permission.2 The result, particularly in
Canada, was to accord plaintiffs an almost unlimited right to litigate in
their home courts to obtain a judgment which was enforceable at least in
the territory of the forum.
The negative aspect of the resulting judgment was that it was generally
not reliably enforceable anywhere other than within the territory of the
forum. Hence, defendants who managed to spirit themselves and their
assets to another jurisdiction before the institution of an action against
them could avoid enforcement of such a judgment. This approach to
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments was summarized by
Buckley L.J. in Emanuel v. Symon:4
In actions in personam there are five cases in which the Courts of this
country will enforce a foreign judgment: (1.) Where the defendant is a
subject of the foreign country in which the judgment has been obtained;
(2.) where he was resident in the foreign country when the action began;
(3.) where the defendant in the character of plaintiff has selected the forum
in which he is afterwards sued; (4.) where he has voluntarily appeared; and
(5.) where he has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the
judgment was obtained.
While expressing some doubts about the continued validity of the first
criterion, and noting that for judgments in rem the British courts have
accepted jurisdictional reciprocity as a basis for recognition of foreign
judgments,' La Forest J. was of the view that this "accurately represents
the common law in England to this day.
' 6
2. P. Finkle & S. Coakeley, "Morguard Investments Limited: Reforming Federalism from the
Top" (1991), 14 D.L.J. 340.
3. Subject to the limitations of the doctrine offorum non conveniens, where the defendant can
persuade a competent court to decline jurisdiction on the ground that there exists another forum
which has the most real and substantial connection to the action and is therefore the more
appropriate and natural forum for the action.
4. (1908] 1 K.B. 302 (C.A.) at 309.
5. See Travers v. Holley, [1953] 2 All E.R. 794 (C.A.).
6. Morguard, supra, note 1 at 1088.
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Prior to Morguard, this approach had been adopted by Canadian
courts, not only in their dealings with foreign judgments, but also in their
dealings with judgments emanating from sister provinces:
Essentially, then, recognition by the courts of one province of a personal
judgment against a defendant given in another province is dependant on
the defendant's presence at the time of the action in the province where the
judgment was given, unless the defendant in some way submits to the
jurisdiction of the court giving the judgment.
7
In La Forest J.'s view, "The English approach.., was unthinkingly
adopted by the courts of this country, even in relation to judgments given
in sister-provinces", s
In Morguard, an Alberta court took jurisdiction, on the basis of service
exjuris, over litigation arising out of the defendant's default on mortgages
entered into while he was resident in Alberta. The defendant had neither
agreed to the Alberta court's jurisdiction nor had he attomed to it. In
accordance with prevailing wisdom of the day, the defendant made no
attempt to contest the action until the plaintiffs requested its enforcement
in his new home province of British Columbia.
Surprisingly, in view of the widespread opinion against enforcement
in such circumstances, all eleven judges hearing the case favoured
granting the order.9 Given "the need in modem times to facilitate the flow
of wealth, skills and people across state lines in a fair and orderly
manner"'0 and his view that the adoption of the English approach by
Canadian courts was a "serious error", La Forest J., writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, left in place the traditional rules,
but added a new basis for jurisdiction.
In developing his new test forrecognition andenforcement of Canadian
judgments, La Forest J. considered the inherent nature of a federation, as
exemplified by practice in the United States and Australia. He also noted
recent developments in the European Community, as well as the approach
of the English House of Lords in Indyka v. Indyka 2 and Dickson J.'s (as
he then was) views in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd.'3 On behalf
of the Court, he then proposed a new test for the recognition and
enforcement of inter-provincial judgments:
7. Ibid., at 1092.
8. Ibid., at 1095.
9. At trial, and unanimously at the British Columbia Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of
Canada levels.
10. Morguard, supra, note I at 1096.
11. Ibid., at 1098.
12. [1969] 1 A.C. 33.
13. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 239, [1974] 2 W.W.R. 586 (hereafter referred to as
Moran v. Pyle).
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As I see it, the courts in one province should give full faith and credit, to
use the language of the United States Constitution, to the judgments given
by a court in another province or a territory, so long as that court has
properly, or appropriately, exercisedjurisdiction in the action. [Emphasis
added.]
14
... fairness to the defendant requires that the judgment be issued by a court
acting through fair process and with properly restrained jurisdiction.
As discussed, fair process is not an issue within the Canadian federation. 5
.... It seems to me that the approach of permitting suit where there is a real
and substantial connection with the action provides a reasonable balance
between the rights of the parties. [Emphasis added.]
6
In order to complete his scheme, La Forest J. also recognized that the
original court may need to use the doctrine of forum non conveniens or
other powers to prevent injustices and that the recognizing and enforcing
court may have to protect against fraud and deal with its own public policy
in some instances.
Morguard was welcomed as a revolutionary advance in Canadian
jurisprudence.17 Nevertheless, in addition to its obvious constitutional
ramifications,18 it raises two major questions. The first concerns the
nature and the limits of this new "real and substantial connection" test for
jurisdiction. The second is whether the new basis for jurisdiction should
apply only between sister provinces, or whether it can be extended to
judgments from truly foreign states. It is somewhat ironic that before the
courts have had an opportunity to begin to consider the first question, they
are already applying the reasoning in Morguard to situations which it
clearly was not intended to cover.
Il. Recent Cases with an International Element
1. Clarke v. Lo Bianco
In Clarke v.Lo Bianco'9 the British Columbia Supreme Court considered
an application for recognition of ajudgment rendered in a California court
against a podiatrist who had moved to British Columbia before the
14. Morguard, supra, note I at 1102.
15.Ibid., at 1103.
16. Ibid., at 1108.
17. See'V. Black &J. Swan, "New Rules fortheEnforcementofForeign Judgments:Morguard
Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye" (1991), 12 Advocates' Quarterly 489; also J. Blom, "Conflict
of Laws - Enforcement of Extraprovincial Default Judgment - Real and Substantial Connec-
tion: Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye" (1991), 70 Can. Bar Rev. 733.
18. See Finkle & Coakeley, supra, note 2.
19. Clarke v. Lo Bianco (1991), 59 B.C.L.R. (2d) 334,84 D.L.R. (4th) 244 (hereafter referred
to as Clarke).
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institution of a malpractice action against him. At the date when the
medical services in issue were rendered, both plaintiff and defendant
were domiciled in the State of California. The defendant was served in
British Columbia with notice of the action, but took no steps to appear,
contest jurisdiction or defend the action. He did comply with an order
obtained in British Columbia requiring him to attend and to give a
deposition in the action. The Superior Court of California, having heard
expert evidence and having considered the defendant's deposition,
rendered judgment in the amount of approximately $500,000.
Josephson J. considered two arguments in deciding whether to allow
enforcement of the California judgment in British Columbia. The first
question was whether the case fell within the categories established in
1908 in Emanuel v. Symon. He then considered the application of the
notion of comity to the facts of this case. Josephson J. pointed out that the
five categories set out in Emanuel v. Symon are non-exhaustive and
subject to enlargement and qualification.20 He then decided that the
defendant's failure to contest jurisdiction permitted an inference that the
defendant, by inaction, had indeed "voluntarily submitted himself to the
risk of litigation in the State of California."' l Thus the case fell within the
Emanuel v. Symon categories.
Citing the now famous passage ofLaForestJ. inMorguard,22 Josephson
J. went on to ask himself whether the notion of comity as applied by the
Supreme Court of Canada should be limited to judgments between sister
provinces. He found that it should not. He saw the Morguard judgment
as compelling "a more comprehensive approach to the issue.... which
ensures that the rationale for reciprocity in a given case is weighed against
concerns for fairness to the defendant." 3 The rationale outlined in
Morguard is "less forceful, but is nonetheless compelling"24 when
20. Ibid., at 338 B.C.L.R., 248 D.L.R.
21. Ibid., at 341 B.C.L.R., 253 D.L.R.
22. "Modem states, however, cannot live in splendid isolation and do give effect to judgments
given in other countries in certain circumstances. Thus a judgment in rem such as a decree of
divorce granted by the courts of one state to persons domiciled there, will be recognized by the
courts of other states. In certain circumstances, as well, our courts will enforce personal
judgments given in other states. Thus, we saw, our courts will enforce an action for breach of
contract given by the courts of another country if the defendant was present there at the time
of the action or has agreed to the foreign court's exercise ofjurisdiction. This, it was thought,
was in conformity with the requirements of comity, the informing principle of private
international law, which has been stated to be the deference and respect due by other states to
the actions of a state legitimately taken within its territory. Since the state where the judgment
was given had power over the litigants, the judgments of its courts should be respected."
Morguard, supra, note 1 at 1095.
23. Clarke, supra, note 19 at 341 B.C.L.R., 252 D.L.R.
24. Ibid.
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applied to a judgment emanating from the State of California rather than
from a sister province. No appeal was taken from Josephson J.'s decision.
2. Minkler and Kirschbaum v. Sheppard
In Minkler and Kirschbaum v. Sheppard,2 a law firm sued in an Arizona
court for services rendered to a company owned by the defendant's
husband. The defendant and her husband had moved from British
Columbia to Arizona before the husband requested the legal" services. The
couple lived in Arizona together for only ten months, then separated. Mrs
Sheppard did not sign as co-obligor to the plaintiff for her husband's debt,
but under the law of Arizona a spouse may be liable for the community
debts of the couple despite notbeing a party to the contract creating them.
The Arizona action was commenced on the day Mrs Sheppard was
moving from the matrimonial home to return to Canada. Spencer J. of the
British Columbia Supreme Court found that Mrs Sheppard was no longer
a resident of Arizona at the time the action was commenced. She was
served exjuris in British Columbia, but never appeared or contested the
action. A defaultjudgment was entered against her and thatjudgment was
the subject of the British Columbia case.
Spencer J. saw the effect of Morguard, Marcotte v. Megson26 and
Clarke as expanding the grounds for recognition of jurisdiction. He cited
two justifications for this position: economic necessity and the
"abandonment of insularity in the thinking of the courts". 2 Referring to
La Forest J.'s view that the world had changed since the English rules
were developed, 28 Spencer J. saw Morguardas approving the recognition
of jurisdiction of a foreign state based on areal and substantial connection
.between the subject matter of the action and the foreign court. He then
decided that Mrs Sheppard had voluntarily subjected herself to Arizona
law by going there to live, so that a real and substantial connection was
present between the subject matter of the action and the State of Arizona.
In answer to the defendant's argument that it would be against British
25. Minkler & Kirschbaum v. Sheppard (1991), 60 B.C.L.R. (2d) 360 (hereafter referred to as
Minkler).
26. Marcott v. Megson (1987), 19 B.C.L.R. (2d) 300, 24 C.P.C. (2d) 201 (Co.Ct.). This
judgment, written by Gow J. while on the County Court Bench, was considered by the British
Columbia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal in Morguard. La Forest J. referred to it as
"a forceful judgment [which] applied the reciprocity approach to an in personam action," and
quoted its headnote in its entirety, Morguard, supra, note 1 at 1093.
27. Minkler, supra, note 25 at 363.
28. Morguard, supra, note 1 at 1096-1098.
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Columbia public policy to enforce a judgment imposing liability which
did not exist in that province, SpencerJ. opted for arestrained interpretation
of the doctrine, observing that there was nothing about the judgment
which was "contrary to ourconceptions of essential justice and morality."
29
3. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Vanstone
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Vanstone,30 the British Columbia
Supreme Court was asked to enforce judgments from the United States
District Court in Oklahoma for amounts due by Vanstone under several
defaulted promissory notes to Oklahoma financial institutions. Vanstone,
a British Columbia resident who had signed the notes while living in
Oklahoma, had been served exjuris with notice of the Oklahoma actions.
He did not appear or defend the actions and default judgments issued.
Gow J. found that none of the categories of Emanuel v. Symon was
present to justify recognition of the Oklahoma court's jurisdiction.3' He
then went on to cite the passage of La Forest J. which defined the
necessary nexus to found the application of full faith and credit between
provinces, the plaintiffs having argued that it could be extended beyond
interprovincial relations to apply to judgments obtained outside Canada.
Gow J. enumerated the evidence connecting Vanstone with the state of
Oklahoma and concluded:
... it is difficult to imagine a more reasonable place for the actions on the
notes to be brought than in the Oklahoma courts. A more "real and
substantial" connection between the indebtedness.., and the Oklahoma
jurisdiction can scarcely be dreamed of.
32
On this basis, he recognized the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court and
ordered the enforcement of the resulting judgments. Gow J. did not
mention the rather crucial distinction between this case and Morguard,
namely the fact that he was faced with a judgment originating outside
Canada. He simply stated that the rule in Morguardapplied. His authority
for extending the notions of comity and full faith and credit between sister
provinces to cases involving a genuinely foreign state is unclear.
29. Minkler, supra, note 25 at 366.
30.FederalDepositInsurance Corp. v. Vanstone (1992), 63 B.C.L.R. (2d) 190,88 D.L.R. (4th)
448 (hereafter referred to as Vanstone).
31. Ibid., at 200.
32. Ibid., at 205.
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4. Resorts International Hotel Inc. c. Auerbach
In Resorts International Hotel Inc. c. Auerbach,33 the Quebec courts
faced the thorny question of public policy. Auerbach had given the
plaintiff hotel a cheque for $10,000 to pay a gambling debt he had
incurred at the plaintiff's New Jersey casino. Although gambling is legal
in New Jersey, article 1927 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada 34 denies
any action for the recovery of a debt arising from a gambling contract. The
defendant invoked article 1927 as a bar to recognition of the New Jersey
judgment and argued that enforcement of the judgment would contravene
Quebec public policy; the Provincial Court (now Quebec Court) rejected
these arguments and enforced the judgment.
35
The Quebec Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the defendant's
appeal Rothman J.A. stated that even if article 1927 of the Civil Code,
as a rule of public policy, applied to contracts entered into in Quebec, it
should not extend so as to apply to contracts governed by foreign laws.3 6
Mailhot J.A. found that the judgment was not based on a gambling debt
but rather on the $10,000 cheque given by the defendant. The case is
interesting in that the question of jurisdiction did not even arise: it seems
to have been presumed by counsel for both parties.
5. Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf
One month after the Quebec Court of Appeal released its judgment in
Resorts, and coincidentally on the same day that the British Columbia
Supreme Court released its judgment in Vanstone, the Ontario Court of
Appeal addressed the same issue as the Quebec Court of Appeal in
Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf.3 s Maalouf, the defendant, had
given the plaintiff casino operator a cheque for $43,000 to pay for a
33. Resorts International Hotel Inc. c. Auerbach (1991), 89 D.L.R. (4th) 688, 43 Q.A.C. 75
(hereafter referred to as Resorts).
34. Article 1927 reads:
II n'y a pas d'action pour le recouvrement de deniers ou autres choses rfclamdes en vertu d'un
contrat de jeu ou d'un pani; mais si les deniers ou les choses ont 6t6 payds par la partie qui a
perdu, its ne peuvent Atre r~pt&s, k moins qu'it n'y ait preuve de fraude.
There is no right of action for the recovery of money or any other thing claimed under a gaming
contract or a bet. But if the money or thing have been paid by the losing party he cannot recover
it back, unless fraud be proved.
35. Resorts International Hotel Inc. c. Auerbach, [1986] R.J.Q. 2479 (C.P.).
36. Resorts, supra, note 33 at 76.
37. Ibid., at 79.
38. BoardwalkRegency Corp. v, Maalouf(1992), 6 O.R. (3d) 737,88 D.L.R. (4th) 612 (C.A.)
(hereafter referred to as Boardwalk).
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gambling debt; the cheque was dishonoured and the plaintiff sued in New
Jersey on the debt. A default judgment was issued and the plaintiff sought
enforcement in Ontario. At trial,39 O'Brien J. had held that the Ontario
Gaming Act40 prevented enforcement as it represented a public policy
against gambling in Ontario. The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal
rejected this view and came to the same conclusion as their colleagues in
Quebec, i.e. that a New Jersey judgment based on a gambling debt
incurred there did not violate public policy in Ontario and, so, could be
enforced. Again, though, the issue of the New Jersey court's jurisdiction
was not addressed.
IV. General Implications of Morguard in the International Sphere
While it is quite clear from the tone of La Forest J.'s comments in
Morguard that he would be disposed to conducting a review of Canada's
recognition and enforcement practices vis-h-vis truly foreignjudgments,
4
1
it must be remembered that he was faced with a fact situation that was
purely Canadian and his analysis was based on the federal nature of the
Canadian state. Hence, although he was drawn into a discussion of the
practices in other federal states, he grounded his analysis in the
Constitution,4' the Charter 43and other Canadian realities.
In proceeding to espouse the granting of "full faith and credit" in
relation to the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments within Canada,
he strongly emphasised the federal aspect of Canada and referred to many
inherent protections in the system:
... The Canadian judicial structure is so arranged that any concerns about
differential quality of justice among the provinces can have no real
foundation. All superior court judges-who also have superintending
control over other provincial courts and tribunals-are appointed and paid
by the federal authorities. And all are subject to final review by the
Supreme Court of Canada, which can determine when the courts of one
province have appropriately exercised jurisdiction in an action and the
circumstances under which the courts of anotherprovince shouldrecognize
such judgments. Any danger resulting from unfair procedure is further
avoided by sub-constitutional factors, such as for example the fact that
Canadian lawyers adhere to the same code of ethics throughout Canada.'
39. Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf (1988), 68 O.R. (2d) 753, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 760
(H.C.J.).
40. R.S.O. 1980, c. 183, iiow R.S.O. 1990, c. G.2.
41. Morguard, supra, note I at 1098.
42. Constitution Act, 1867.
43. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11.
44. Morguard, supra, note 1 at 1099-1100.
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In emphasising these federal protections, he appeared to contrast the
interprovincial situation with the truly international one.
By limiting his context to the Canadian federation, La Forest J. was
able to address two sides of a symmetrical relationship: in laying down
the rules for recognition and enforcement, he also lays down the rules for
taking jurisdiction. Failure to follow the latter will result in
non-enforcement. The reality of the international situation, though, is that
there is an absence of symmetry and an inability of any one body to
impose such symmetry on diverse regimes throughout the world.45 In the
absence of symmetry, though, the enforcing court cannot assume that
appropriate rules existed in the issuing court, let alone that they were
followed, and so must embark upon an enquiry as to the propriety of the
issuing court's actions before enforcing its orders. Hence, while Canadian
enforcing courts can now assume that other Canadian courts will only
take and exercise jurisdiction in appropriate situations, no such assumption
can be made about the courts of other places; who, other than Canadian
courts, will make sure that a Canadian defendant's legitimate interests
will be protected in Europe, the United States, Australia or Upper
Matabele Land?
Canadian courts, when asked to enforce foreign judgments, will have
to have "... due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of [their] own citizens [and] other persons who are under
[their] protection". In accomplishing this, the Canadian enforcing court
will have to consider:
1 The basis on which foreign courts take jurisdiction;
2 The way in which foreign courts exercise their jurisdiction (i.e. the
question of fairness to the defendant); and
3 Whether, notwithstanding having passed the first two tests, there are
public policy reasons not to enforce resulting judgments.
These concerns are discussed in greater detail in the remaining sections
of this article.
45. It is clear from the judgment that La Forest J. believes that times change and that the courts
must adapt to the needs of the times. He also rejects rigid formulations of notions such as comity
and reciprocity, favouring more comprehensive definitions:
"Comity" in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws... Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)
at 163-4, cited by Estey J. in Spencer v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278 at 283, Morguard,
supra, note 1 at 1096.
He does not, however, consider how these principles might work on the international level,
limiting his analysis to the needs of the Canadian federation.
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V. The Basis on Which Foreign Courts takeJurisdiction: The relationship
with "real and substantial sonnection"
The notion of "real and substantial connection" is not novel. La Forest J.
cited with approval the 1975 decision of Moran v. Pyle, where the Court
decided that the province must have a "real and substantial connection"
with the action in order to exercise jurisdiction over an Ontario corporate
defendant who had no presence in Saskatchewan, but whose defective
light bulb had caused the death of a Saskatchewan resident in that
province. However, by using a variety of different terms to express the
requisite nexus between a court and the matter before it, the Supreme
Court has left open the possibility of several distinct possible connections.
Must the forum province have real and substantial connections to the
"damages suffered",46to "legal obligations" arising from the situation,47
to the transaction or to the parties?48 Are these connections alternative or
cumulative? La Forest J. indicated that there must be some limit to the
exercise of jurisdiction against persons outside the province. "[A] nexus
may have to be sought between the subject-matter of the action and the
territory where the action was brought [emphasis added]."'49 Paraphrasing
the judgment, Joost Blom suggests that it leaves open an argument "for
any connection that makes the province a 'reasonable place for the action.
to take place'.
'50
The lines of demarcation of the limits to competence established under
the real and substantial connection test are unclear, although this
requirement is designed to protect the defendant's interests against being
sued in "jurisdictions having little or no connection with transaction or
the parties."5 Clearly, a Canadian court's duty to protect the legitimate
interests of defendants is significantly higher when the judgment to be
enforced comes from outside the enforcing court's symmetrical system,
because there is no other available means to ensure that minimum
Canadian notions of fairness have been applied to Canadian defendants.
Given North American realities, Canadian courts will be called upon
to deal with many different types of American judgments. The American
Fourteenth Amendment protection of due process provides one limit to
extra-territorial jurisdiction in that country. To satisfy the requirements
46. Morguard, supra, note I at 1108.
47. Ibid., at 1102.
48. Ibid., at 1108.
49. Ibid., at 1104.
50. Blom, supra, note 17 at 741.
51. Morguard, supra, note 1 at 1108.
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of due process, it is necessary that the defendant have some minimum
contacts with the forum state. 2 Whether the American minimum contacts
are sufficiently "real and substantial" to meet the Morguard test will only
become clear as Canadian courts recognize and exercise their obligations
under Morguard.
The British Columbia Supreme Court, in three of the cases referred to
above, saw no difficulty in extending the reasoning of Morguard to cases
involving states of the United States, that is, to truly international
situations. It is doubtful whether the Supreme Court of Canada really
intended to go this far, this fast. The emphasis on the contrast between
interprovincial and truly international cases certainly indicates that the
Court was concerned specifically with the Canadian context. On the other
hand, the second branch of the Court's reasoning-with its redefinition
of comity and its concern for the evolving needs of international
commerce-does leave room for expansion of the principle into the
international forum. Clearly Gow and Spencer JJ. arewilling to carry the
logic into non-Canadian cases which would not benefit from the systemic
protections inherent in our federal grouping. This may be appropriate,
and even practical, insofar as American judgments are concerned, because
they emanate from a legal system which is similar to our own. However,
Canadianjudges will eventually face more difficult decisions when asked
to recognize judgments from other foreign states where principles of
justice, court procedures and judicial protections are less similar to ours.
The provincial court judgments, so far, provide no workable grounds
upon which to distinguish between one kind of foreign judgment and
another, and they have not begun to consider what type of contacts
between an issuing court and the action before it are sufficient.
The British Columbia Supreme Court seems unconcerned by this
uncertainty, and as none oftherecent cases will go to appeal, unfortunately
we will not soon benefit from the wisdom of a higher court. In the Quebec
andOntario cases, the Courts of Appeal were not invited to express their
views on this aspect of Morguard. In the meantime, defendants hoping to
contest liabilities adjudicated in foreign jurisdictions should take care to
make their arguments in the court of first instance, no matter how
inconvenient or expensive it is to appear. Adopting the old "sit-tight"
approach is no longer a safe alternative. Those who ignore foreign
proceedings now face a serious risk of finding themselves bound in their
home jurisdiction without recourse to traditional protections.
52. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).
Morguard Investments Ltd: Emerging International Implications
There is, of course, a danger to defendants in this approach: attorning
to the foreign court's jurisdiction is one of the traditional grounds for
enforcing a foreign judgment. Defendants would be well advised to make
it abundantly clear that any challenge they make does not constitute an
admission that the foreign court has jurisdiction.
VI. The Way in Which Foreign Courts Exercise Their Jurisdiction:
Fairness to the defendant
La Forest J. made it clear in Morguard that fairness to the defendant was
an integral element of any scheme dealing with the recognition and
enforcement of judgments from other jurisdictions. Permitting suit in
accordance with the real and substantial connection test achieves a
balance between the interests of the defendant and the plaintiff as to
where the suit will be .decided. In addition, the way in which the suit is
decided must also be fair to the defendant. In the Canadian context,
though, this was not an issue.53 Hence, the Supreme Court did not turn its
mind to what would constitute a lack of fairness to defendants, e.g.
whether the fairness which is sought is procedural, substantive or both,
and offers no guidance to lower courts.
It is probably safe to say that proceedings which violate Canadian
notions of natural justice would prima facie render a foreign judgment
unenforceable in Canada. Hence, denying the defendant an opportunity
to make a full defence (by, for example, unreasonably preventing the
defendant from cross-examining and calling witnesses), denying the
defendant access to counsel (although limiting the use of counsel in small
claims courts might not be objectionable), obvious discrimination against
the defendant on the basis of sex, ethnic or religious background, etc.,
would all likely be adequate grounds to deny enforcement of a foreign
judgment. Presumably, too, ajudgment which, while being free from any
procedural defects, was based on substantive law which violated Canadian
notions ofjustice and equality would not be enforced by Canadian courts.
These issues, though, have only been addressed indirectly by the cases
decided so far.
In Clarke, the Supreme Court of British Columbia commented, "No
concern can be expressed about the quality ofjustice as it relates to cases
of this nature in the state of California [emphasis added] ."4 Can one infer
from this that there are, or could be, concerns about the quality of justice
53. See La Forest .'s comments in Morguard, supra, note I at 1099-1100, quoted at page 640,
supra.
54. Clarke, supra, note 19 at 342 B.C.L.R., 252 D.L.R.
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in the State of California in other types of cases? Whatever the answer,
Josephson J. has not even-explained how he came to his conclusion about
California justice in this case. In Minkler, Spencer J. comments, the
Arizona court's "process for service and for proceeding in default of
appearance is similar to ours and must be regarded as fair and properly
restrained in terms of jurisdiction."55 The fact that the United States
minimum contacts test seems, on its face, quite different from our real and
substantial connection test attracted no special attention from Spencer J.
In Vanstone, Gow J. does not turn his mind to the matter, although he does
appear to conclude that the Oklahoma-judgment is free from "an odious
taint", whatever that may be.56 Neither Boardwalk nor Regency consider
this question.
Even if one were to accept that in all civil actions the quality of justice
in the State of California is more than acceptable, can the same be said for
all jurisdictions in the United States? in the Americas? in Europe? in the
rest of the world? How is this determination to be made? If it is an ad hoc
one that each judge makes in each case, it would seem to become a
question of fact which must be supported by the evidence.
It might, facetiously, be suggested that there is now a need for a Quality
of Justice Rating Service, along the lines of the financial Bond Rating
Services; the fact remains, though, that notions of fairness, justice and
appropriate extra-territorial jurisdiction are different in different parts of
the world. Eventually, Canadian courts will be faced with the problem of
discriminating amongst judgments from many diffeient jurisdictions.
The Morguard decision seems to be aiming for a uniformity of approach
across Canada; if its principles are to be adopted outside the Canadian
context, it is hard to imagine how these issues could be addressed in a
uniform way unless the Supreme Court develops appropriate rules for the
enforcement of truly foreign judgments or Parliament adopts international
agreements which pre-determine such issues. The most obvious other
alternative is a case-by-case approach in each provincial court.
VII. Public Policy Exceptions
Perhaps the most important symbolic aspect of the development of a
practical international approach to recognition and enforcement is the
manner in which Canadian and foreign courts resolve situations where
there are significant differences in public policy between jurisdictions.
Situations where there are significant differences in policy between the
55. Minkler, supra, note 25 at 354.
56. Vanstone, supra, note 30 at 205-6. B.C.L.R., 463-4 D.L.R.
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issuing court and the recognizing court provide, in a sense, the test for a
recognition regime. These types of recognition and enforcement cases are
also of special significance for another reason. The manner in which the
public policy doctrine is interpreted and applied provides a useful
indication of the attitude that courts are likely to take towards the
enforcement of foreign judgments.
57
Viewed from this perspective, the outlook for easy and, perhaps,
almost automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments emanating
from American state and federal courts is very propitious, even if no
coordinated legislative or judicial approach were to be adopted. In the
five cases noted above, public policy grounds were raised directly or
implicitly by defendants as a reason for declining recognition and
enforcement of judgments from American state courts, and in all five the
public policy argument was rejected. In Clarke, the defendant raised the
public policy issue only indirectly and less persuasively by drawing the
court's attention to the fact that the judgment awarded and being sued on
was larger than would be typical in a similar British Columbia case.58 This
case probably provides little guidance on the developing post-Morguard
judicial attitude towards the public policy element of foreign judgments,
but the other four are very useful in that regard.
In Minkler, the public policy issue was raised directly and in a manner
that might, quite conceivably, have been very persuasive, especially if the
court had been generally disinclined to recognize foreign judgments. In
this case, the defendant raised the public policy doctrine based on the
considerable difference between the Arizona law on marital property and
the law in British Columbia.59 The Arizona law which imposes liability
on a wife for the debts of her husband is, in fact, at opposite poles from
the approach taken in British Columbia.60 The debt in question was
incurred in the normal course of the husband's business and his wife
specifically declined to co-sign for the obligation. This defence was
rejected on the grounds that the public policy exception should only apply
in cases of "'essential public or moral interests'... 'founded in moral
turpitude' and 'inconsistent with the good order and solid interests of
society.' "61
57. See, for example, Olshen v. Kaufman, 385 P.2d 161. (Ore., 19632); Lilienthal v. Kaufman,
395 P.2d 543 (Ore., 1964), (hereafter referred to collectively as Kaufman).
58. Clarke, supra, note 19 at 342 B.C.L.R., 252-3 D.L.R.
59. Minkler, supra, note 25 at 365.
60. See Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121.
61. Nat'l Surety Co. v. Larsen, [1929] 4 D.L.R. 918, [1929] 3 W.W.R. 299 (B.C.C.A.), at 941
D.L.R., 320 W.W.R., per Macdonald J.A., quoted in Block Brothers Realty Ltd. v. Mollard
(1981), 27 B.C.L.R. 17,122 D.L.R. (3d) 323 (C.A.)per Craig J.A., Minkler, supra, note 25 at
366.
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The same issue arose in Boardwalk and Resorts, where New Jersey
state courts gave judgment for the plaintiffs on legally incurred gambling
debts. The judgments were sued on in Ontario and Quebec where the
defendants asked that recognition and enforcement be refused on the
grounds of public policy. The defendants' arguments would seem, at first
glance, to be rather persuasive since gambling debts are often used in
standard conflict of laws text books as an example of the type of foreign
contract that should not be enforced on the basis of the public policy
exception. Such debts are often seen as founded in moral turpitude and as
inconsistent with public order and, in this case, the particular type of
contracts, based as they were on gambling debts, would have been
unenforceable in Ontario and Quebec.
In Boardwalk, however, a divided Ontario Court of Appeal, notes that
gambling is legal in the jurisdiction where the debt was originally
incurred and, though it is formally illegal in Ontario, it is, in practice a
regulated rather than a forbidden activity. In certain circumstances,
gambling is permitted and, in the case of lotteries, even encouraged by the
province. This persuaded the majority that gambling was no longer an
activity that violated community moral standards in a manner which
might call into play the public policy doctrine.
The Court's discussion of the morality of gambling gives rise to the
question of whether the public policy doctrine has much further meaning
for Ontario courts. Since gambling, prostitution, abortion and various
once-forbidden sexual practices are now either completely legal or
regulated in Canada, judgments from foreign jurisdictions that are based
on such activity might well be enforceable in Ontario. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine a North American or western European court actually
issuing ajudgment which would be contrary to public policy as it has been
interpreted in Boardwalk. While this is not necessarily a troubling
outcome, it does suggest that there may be problems with the consistent
application of this doctrine amongst the provinces. For instance, one
wonders how a Nova Scotia or Alberta court might have dealt with the
same case.
62
Another interesting aspect of these cases is that the Ontario, Quebec
and British Columbia courts seem to make no distinction in their
application of their respective public policy doctrines on the basis of the
jurisdictional origin of the case. For example, the British Columbia court
62. Based on Clarke, Minkler and Vanstone, there wouldappearto be little doubt that the British
Columbia courts would have had no compunction enforcing either of the New Jersey
judgments.
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rejects the defence of public policy to a judgment emanating from
Arizona on the basis of a definition of public policy drawn from a wholly
domestic Canadian case involving parties in British Columbia and
Alberta. In Boardwalk and Resorts, as well, no distinction is drawn
between the application of the public policy doctrine to judgments from
foreign or domestic Canadian courts. It is not surprising that no such
distinction is made because, pre-Morguard, no such distinction was
drawn in the way foreign judgments were treated, regardless of whether
they emanated from Canadian provincial courts or those of another
nation.
This raises the question whether there may now be a need for different
public policy standards depending on whether the judgment emanates
from a Canadian or foreign jurisdiction. While it is unlikely that an
interpretation and application of the public policy doctrine like that taken
in Boardwalk would threaten to disrupt the development of a new
Canadian standard based on Morguard,63 there is no assurance that other
provincial courts will take theBoardwalk approach. From the perspective
of the future development of Canadian federalism, there is a risk that any
public policy exception to what should now be the routine enforceability
of judgments might compromise the development of a "full. faith and
credit" legal regime within Canada. Moreover, any public policy doctrine
applicable to Canadianjudgments creates risk and possible complications
for plaintiffs using provincial enforcement procedures.
It is noteworthy, however, that American state courts have continued
to use a public policy exception, albeit in very, very rare instances and
without approval from the American Supreme Court, to refuse enforcement
of domestic American judgments from sister courts, despite a
constitutionally entrenched requirement that all courts afford "full faith
and credit" to domestic legal decisions originating in otherjurisdictions. 6
American practice on this point should be set in context before it is used
as a precedent for Canadian legal development.
The United States has always had a constitutionally mandated
requirement for "full faith and credit" while the Canadian version has
only just begun to develop. The American requirement for "full faith and
credit" is grounded in the text of a revered Constitution while ours is
derived from a virtually unknown recent court case. Since the American
63. In fact, if Carthy J.A. is correct in looking to the Criminal Code for an indication of public
policy, this would indicate that there is only one public policy in Canada. Hence, by definition,
a valid judgment of a Canadian court would not violate the public policy of any other Canadian
court. The defendant who wished to dispute a judgment on a public policy ground would be
limited to appealing it in the province in which it was issued.
64. Kaufinan, supra, note 57.
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courts need not work to develop a full-faith-and-credit regime, they can
afford a nascent, almost unused public policy exception applicable to
domestic judgments. It is much less clear how a public policy exception
applicable to judgments originating in Canadian courts might affect the
future development of a "full faith and credit" legal regime in Canada.
In any case, since Morguard, it is increasingly evident that Canadian
courts are likely to need to develop and apply at least two separate
approaches to the public policy doctrine. There will likely be, first of all,
a purely domestic public policy doctrine which admits of no or very, very
few exceptions, much like that which exists in the United States. Any
other approach to public policy in the domestic context could easily lead
to either the diffusion or the defeat of full faith and credit within Canada.
In practice, this would mean the Supreme Court of Canada would
ultimately have to define the appropriate public policy standard and
supervise its application in domestic decisions. If it did not, the promise
of a new legal regime embodied in the Morguard decision would
eventually be compromised.
The manner in which the public policy issue was raised and discussed
in most of the cases noted above gives some cause for concern about the
future development of the Morguard decision. While each of these
decisions provided the courts some opportunity, at least in obiter, to
refine the public policy doctrine which was raised by the defence, none
did. Indeed, several courts defended their enforcement of non-Canadian
judgments which might have been judged contrary to Canadian public
policy by referring to Morguard. While such enforcement may be wholly
appropriate, the cases did raise the issue of whether the same public policy
doctrine should be applied to both foreign and domestic cases. It is, to an
extent, understandable that the courts seem to have missed this point,
because it is a new one in the Canadian context.
In the post-Morguard era, a meaningful public policy approach
applicable to truly foreign judgments is probably both necessary and
appropriate as a means to provide a regular review of, and perhaps a shield
against, the enforcement of some judgments in Canadian courts. Such a
doctrine needs to be carefully defined so that it does not disrupt the
development of full faith and credit to Canadian judgments, where a very
much more restricted doctrine may, perhaps, be appropriate.
VIII. Conclusion
That the Morguard decision will lead to a consideration and perhaps
a restructuring of federalism in Canada is no longer any surprise. It is,
however, interesting and noteworthy that acase involving the enforceability
of a provincial judgment by other provincial courts may well lead to a
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re-consideration of the Canadian approach to the enforceability of truly
foreign judgments. The British Columbia and other courts deserve
applause for beginning to address the international implications of the
Morguard case. If they have, so far, left the conceptual basis for their
decisions undeveloped, that lacuna is understandable in the light of
Canadian legal history. What must be of much greater concern is the
implications of these cases for the future.
It is not at all clear, for example, whether the courts, by themselves, can
develop a consistent and predictable and appropriate means for enforcing
some foreign judgments and not others. Indeed, so far, the courts have
done little to clarify either the jurisdictional basis on which they will
judge the fairness of extra-territorial jurisdiction extended by foreign
courts or their views about public policy in enforcement. While the
common law tradition suggests that with time it will work out, in the
present situation it mightbe more expeditious and convenient if Canadian
and American governments helped the process of legal development
along by defining appropriate extra-territorial jurisdiction and limited the
operation of the public policy doctrine as between their courts by a treaty
as the Europeans have done.
The Canadian courts face a difficult enough task working out the
domestic implications of the Morguard decision without the added
complexity and confusion of trying to define the implications of the case
for foreign decisions. Governments should share this burden with the
courts: it will not only lead to greater consistency and clarity in the
international realm but would afford the courts a better chance to develop
the domestic implications of Morguard; that is surely enough challenge
for the next decade or so.
